Russia and the West: Where did it all go wrong? - BBC News
Russia–United States relations refers to the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia. The United States and Russia maintain diplomatic and . The relationship between the United States and Russia is among the most critical bilateral relationships in the world, with implications well beyond the two states. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are in the midst of a budding bromance, and the China-Russia relationship is being helped along by a common.
Moscow very much appreciated that Tehran did not side with fellow Muslims in the first Chechen warbut expressed support for the continued territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
Since Iran is also vulnerable to secessionist movements, it shares a common interest with Moscow in suppressing them. Finally, Moscow and Tehran both supported Afghan forces opposing the Taliban. The five littoral states were and indeed, still are unable to agree on how to divide the Caspian and the petroleum reserves beneath it.Why Does Russia Hate The United States?
The main protagonists in this conflict, though, have not been Iran and Russia, but Iran and Azerbaijan. Even so, this supposedly secret but widely known agreement did not impinge too much on Russian-Iranian relations; it reportedly did not cover "in progress" Russian agreements with Iran, and Washington and Moscow disagreed about what was "in progress. Putin publicly repudiated the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in October This was followed by the announcement of new Russian arms sales to Tehran as well as a renewed Russian commitment to completing the Bushehr reactor.
President Khatami paid a much-publicized visit to Russia in March While this did not directly threaten Russia, it threatened Russian interests, as Azerbaijan turned toward the United States and Turkey for support. Moscow conducted a large naval exercise in the Caspian in August to show who was really in charge there.
At the same time, Moscow feared that Khatami's "Dialogue of Civilizations" foreign-policy approach would lead to an Iranian-American rapprochement that would result in Russia's having even less influence in Tehran.
Putin soon learned, however, that Ahmadinejad's anti-Americanism did not make Tehran more willing to cooperate with Moscow. Putin appears to have genuinely believed that his various offers to enrich uranium to commercial grade for Tehran would serve to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. Iran would acquire uranium for its nuclear reactor, American and Western concerns about Iran's enriching uranium to weapons grade would be assuaged, and both sides would value Russia for allaying their mutual suspicions.
While Tehran has expressed interest in each of these offers, its insistence on enriching at least some of its own uranium has only heightened Western concerns about the Iranian nuclear program as well as prevented Moscow from achieving its diplomatic ambitions toward Iran and the West. Russian diplomacy appeared designed to convey to Tehran that Russia could protect Iran from the West at the United Nations if Tehran cooperated with Russia, but that Russia could side with the West against Iran if Tehran did not.
Much to Moscow's frustration and amazement, this strategy did not prove successful. On the other hand, Moscow has again, along with Beijing worked with the United States and the EU-3 to impose some sanctions on the Iranian government for its noncompliance.
This ambivalent diplomacy appears to result from ambivalent motives. Moscow delights in thwarting American foreign-policy aims but also wants to be seen as a responsible great power. Similarly, Moscow wants to maintain and further good relations with Iran especially in the economic spherebut — like the West — does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
Even when Moscow has voted for Security Council resolutions against Iran, it has sought to mollify Tehran by pointing out that Russia actually helped Iran by watering down the harsher terms that the West hoped to include. In earlyfor example, the Russian foreign minister sought to curry favor with Tehran by arguing that the new Security Council resolution contained no new sanctions, and that Russia had worked to soften it. The Iranian government and media, though, have not been impressed by this argument.
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They have criticized Moscow for working with the West to pass any resolutions against Tehran when Moscow could have blocked them altogether through the use of its veto power in the Security Council. Moscow pointed out that this resolution did not impose any new sanctions against Iran but merely urged it to comply fully and without delay with previous resolutions and with the IAEA. The atomic-energy reactor Russia has been helping Iran build in Bushehr has also been a source of discord between Moscow and Tehran.
Much to Iran's annoyance, Russia repeatedly delayed the completion of the reactor. After Putin's October visit to Tehran, however, a breakthrough appeared to be made. Shortly thereafter December JanuaryRussia finally delivered the enriched uranium needed for starting up the plant.
At the time, Russian officials stated that this delivery would enable the Bushehr reactor to be up and running by the end of Reasons cited included unspecified "technological" work and the need for the delivery of about 1, tons of equipment, integrating Russian equipment with that delivered by the West Germans, who had begun the plant before the Iranian Revolution. While a Russian news report claimed that Iran "looks satisfied" with the schedule for completing Bushehr,16 Iranian sources indicated that Tehran was not.
On November 1,for example, the Iranian energy minister complained, They have promised to complete it by next year. We hope that they will not fail to carry it out [their promise].
They have promised several times but they did not carry it out for some reason.
Russia–United States relations - Wikipedia
Maybe they have their own reasons. One factor that may well have delayed Russian completion of the Bushehr reactor is the ongoing Russian-Iranian disagreement over whether Iran should enrich its own uranium.
Iran has long claimed that it is only working on a peaceful nuclear-energy program — as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows it to do — and is not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States and other Western governments, though, fear that Iran may be using its atomic-energy program as a cover for a nuclear-weapons program. They fear that if Iran develops the capacity to enrich uranium to the lower grade needed for a nuclear reactor, it will also be able to acquire the ability to enrich uranium to the higher grade needed for nuclear weapons.
Putin sought to resolve this problem through various proposals involving enriching uranium for Iran in Russia.
Russia and Iran | Middle East Policy Council
Putin even obtained the Bush administration's approval for delivering commercially enriched uranium for the Bushehr reactor in December Januarysince this supported the argument that Iran did not need to enrich uranium itself in order to run its nuclear reactor. Tehran, however, has insisted all along that even if it obtains enriched uranium from other countries, it is determined to also enrich at least some of its own uranium.
According to some reports, Israeli forces have developed serious plans for such an attack,20 of which Tehran is undoubtedly well aware. One of the ways in which Tehran has responded is by attempting to acquire S long-range surface-to-air missile systems from Russia in order to deter or thwart such an attack.
Both the United States and Israel a state with which Moscow maintains friendly ties have strongly urged Russia not to provide these weapons to Iran. They fear that Iranian acquisition of the Ss would only help and encourage Tehran in developing nuclear weapons.
Russian commentary on this subject has often been ambiguous, sometimes suggesting that it could sell Ss to Iran, while at others indicating that it is not doing so. Whether due to a misreading of Russian statements or a desire to push Moscow on this issue, Iranian officials have sometimes announced that Moscow has either agreed to sell or has actually shipped Ss to Tehran.
This has resulted in an international furor especially in the United States and Israelwith Moscow stating more forcefully than usual that these Iranian claims are untrue, and Tehran claiming disappointment with Moscow. Just such a scenario unfolded in Decemberwhen the Iranian defense minister claimed that Moscow was selling Ss to Tehran, and Moscow subsequently denied doing so. One Russian journalist indicated that Moscow specifically reassured the Israelis about this in order not to jeopardize the Russian military's efforts to purchase Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles: High-level Iranian officials figure as the source more often than not.
If so, Moscow's insistence on denying them was frustrating to Tehran, since they advertised that Iran does not possess Ss, that Iran is thus vulnerable to attack, and that Russia could do something to help Iran but chooses not to. It must be especially galling for Tehran to think that Moscow is denying them to Iran at the behest of Israel — the enemy Tehran wants Russian Ss to defend itself against.
The fact that there was an Iranian student protest in early January in front of the Russian consulate in Gilan over Russia's silence about Israel's intervention in Gaza, and that this was reported by Iran's Fars News Agency, could be seen as an expression of Tehran's disapproval for the close ties between Russia and Israel.
China and Russia strengthening relationship in bid to thwart US dominance
In addition to protest in Iran against what was widely believed to be falsified election results, the Green Movement frequently denounced Russia during its demonstrations. Moscow, then, was especially unhappy when, in DecemberAhmadinejad began calling for Russia to pay compensation for the Soviet occupation of the northern half of Iran during World War II. This was a subject, though, that Moscow did not even want to discuss. It does not see itself as owing anyone for any actions it took in conjunction with defeating the Nazis, and it does not want to set a precedent for providing compensation to any other countries — such as those in the Baltics and Eastern Europe — that the Soviets occupied for far longer.
There were also other annoyances to Russian-Iranian relations. In Decemberthe former head of the Secretariat of Iran's High Council of Marine Industries complained that Russia had not built three 63,ton ships that Iran had ordered for use in the Caspian. In addition, he also complained that, despite Russian-Iranian efforts to construct a North-South transit corridor from Iran through the Caucasus to Russia and points beyondDagestan a Russian autonomous republic in the Northern Caucasus just east of Chechnya was not allowing non-CIS Commonwealth of Independent States trucks to drive across its territory.
This is an important indicator that both states see each other as important partners. They now conduct joint military exercises from the Sea of Japan to the Mediterranean.
For decades, Russia resisted selling its most advanced military equipment to China but not anymore. Vladimir Putin says Russia has tested an array of new strategic nuclear weapons. ABC News "If we look back 15 years the Russians only provided second or third-grade military hardware to China but today Russia is providing top-grade military technology and equipment. This is indicative of a strategic shift on the Russian side," Professor Nagy said.
Russia and the West: Where did it all go wrong?
In the longer term Russia may have more to fear from a rising aggressive China, but for now, Professor Nagy said the two acting in unison was an effective way to confront the US without leading to direct conflict. The Soviet Union's downfall only took 20 years from there. And the architect of that move, master political strategist Henry Kissinger, has apparently counselled Mr Trump to pursue "a reverse Nixon China strategy" by seeking to befriend Moscow to isolate Beijing.
It's an acknowledgement of how the Russia-China relationship can define the world order.